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福建雷达干扰台湾“铺路爪”?   

2014-06-07 13:29:55|  分类: 军情观察 |  标签: |举报 |字号 订阅

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简氏防务周刊报道说,中国大陆在福建惠安修建了一个大型相控阵雷达,用于干扰台湾的“铺路爪”远程预警雷达。但是笔者经过考察地图,认为这种说法不合常理,缺乏依据。

2014年06月07日 - kktt - 长缨在手  敢缚苍龙

New Chinese radar may have jammed Taiwan's SRP
Richard D Fisher Jr, Washington, DC and Sean O'Connor, Indiana - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
05 June 2014

Taiwan's new USD1.38 billion long-range radar, the Surveillance Radar Programme (SRP), has been fully operational for about a year. However, China may already have the ability to interfere with its signals, according to sources in Taiwan and Washington.

Development of the SRP, which is intended to provide Taiwan with a form of "strategic depth" by providing very early warning of Chinese long-range air and missile activity, dates back to 2000 when its sale was approved by the Clinton Administration. Following repeated delays and cost overruns, Taiwanese officials revealed that it was operational in February 2013.

Taiwan's SRP is based on the Raytheon AN/FPS-115 Pave Paws large phased array radar (LPAR). Located at Loshan Mountain in Hsinchu County, Taiwan, it is reported to have a range of 5,000 km (3,100 n miles), and it is able to track a golf ball-sized target out to 3,000 km. Taiwanese officials revealed that it was able to track North Korea's 12 December 2013 satellite launch, which was about 1,800 km from Taiwan.

Satellite imagery obtained by IHS Jane's shows that China has built a large phased array radar north of Huian in Fujian Province approximately 240 km northwest of Taiwan's SRP. The Chinese radar array, constructed sometime before 2008, is similar in size to the SRP. It appears to employ a fixed array boresighted along an azimuth of approximately 144 degrees. With an assumed coverage of +/-60 degrees in azimuth, the Chinese LPAR is theoretically capable of monitoring the entire Taiwan Strait region, as well as the southern approaches to the South China Sea.

Like Taiwan's radar, the Chinese radar is located on a hill top. By matching the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) of Taiwan's radar signals the Chinese radar can interfere with the ability of the SRP to track targets. Radar pulses can be made to be very complex to avoid such interference but China can employ electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems to determine the SRP's signals.

According to a US source, the US Navy has to space its large Aegis phased array radars within a naval battlegroup in order to avoid radar interference.

A senior political source in Taiwan confirmed to IHS Jane's that China's radar has "interfered" with the SRP.

This interference is noteworthy given the LPAR's design. Two other LPARs in eastern China feature very different arrays and are believed to serve in a ballistic missile early warning or anti-satellite tracking capacity.

The different design of the LPAR at Huian - and the reports from Taiwan of interference - indicate that electronic interference represents a possible design driver for the new array that could possibly influence its location. The postulated 120 degree coverage arc of the LPAR also means it could interfere with other Taiwanese sensor systems deployed along the island's western side.

Chinese radar coverage of the Taiwan Strait region is robust, with multiple radar complexes monitoring airspace and sea traffic. This eliminates the requirement for an LPAR to solely serve as an additional monitoring station. However, given its ability to monitor far larger regions than any other deployed radar system in the area, airspace monitoring is believed to represent a major portion of the new LPAR's mission.

The LPAR could also be used to monitor air and space activity well beyond Taiwan if the People's Liberation Army attacked the island. Assuming that Chinese forces disable or destroy Taiwan's SRP, the LPAR's role would then be to provide long-range coverage extending north to Japan and to the Philippines.

Lastly, China also has a political motivation to match Taiwan's huge investment in an LPAR. By doing so, Beijing demonstrates that it can win the arms race with Taipei: a move that could be part of a wider propaganda campaign to demoralise Taiwan and increase the pressure for unification.

Jane's的文章自己都说了,福建惠安的雷达朝向方位角是144度(下图中的黄线),与其到台湾铺路爪雷达的连线方向(下图中的红线)有36度的夹角。如果说福建的这个雷达是专门用于干扰台湾的铺路爪雷达,那么这个夹角是没必要的。

福建雷达干扰台湾铺路爪? - kktt - 长缨在手  敢缚苍龙
 
福建雷达干扰台湾铺路爪? - kktt - 长缨在手  敢缚苍龙
 
福建雷达干扰台湾铺路爪? - kktt - 长缨在手  敢缚苍龙

福建惠安的雷达站和台湾乐山的雷达站海拔高度分别是730m和2600m,经过计算,在245 km距离上两者刚好能够相互看到。但是乐山雷达的仰角是3度以上,一般雷达主瓣的波束宽度是2~3度,因此惠安的雷达波肯定无法进入其主瓣。相控阵雷达的一大特点就是低副瓣,国外先进的相控阵雷达已经可以做到副瓣电平比主瓣峰值低40~50dB以上,在遇到干扰源时还可以采用特定方向的副瓣调零技术。因此惠安雷达发出的干扰信号即使能够进入乐山雷达的副瓣(还只是某些特定观测角度时),其干扰效果也是令人怀疑的。

那么,应该如何干扰地基预警监视雷达?一般使用空基平台(有人或无人电子战飞机、浮空器等)携带电子干扰机。空基平台的好处是位置高且位置可变。比如铺路爪在200 km距离远处可观测目标最低高度为10480 m(3度仰角),只有飞机或飞艇才能到达。当敌方雷达在低仰角扫描时,我方干扰机可以直接进入敌方雷达的扫描空域进行欺骗式干扰,并不断变换位置。当敌方雷达在高仰角扫描时,我方干扰机可针对敌方雷达的副瓣方向进行噪声压制干扰,以掩护主瓣方向上的我方目标。

福建雷达干扰台湾铺路爪? - kktt - 长缨在手  敢缚苍龙

参考文献:张锡祥主编,《新体制雷达对抗导论》(第9章 对相控阵雷达的干扰),北京理工大学出版社,2010年版
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