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长缨在手 敢缚苍龙

 
 
 
 
 

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我国的战术核武器计划  

2015-11-19 14:36:30|  分类: 核武器 |  标签: |举报 |字号 订阅

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根据目前能看到的公开资料,我国在文革后期曾有计划研制一种配装近程弹道导弹的战术核武器。导弹代号DF-61,直径1米,长9米,发射质量约6吨,投掷能力为500kg/1000km(核弹头)或1000kg/600km(常规弹头),使用可贮存的液体燃料AK-40和UDMH,制导方式为捷联惯导。核弹头代号575,使用原子弹战斗部,1976年1月进行了核试验。常规弹头使用子母弹或燃料空气弹战斗部。DF-61计划用于对付苏联可能的入侵,常规版用于对朝鲜军援。1978年项目下马。

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1965年8月9-10日  钱学森参加了周恩来主持的中央专门委员会第13次会议。专委会上提出争取提前搞出固体导弹。原七机部四院开始组建固体导弹的研制队伍,论证固体导弹发展规划。当时,虽然解决了推进剂配方和浇铸成型工艺,不稳定燃烧等技术难题,但要研制大型固体发动机还是很困难的。在比较几个方案之后,七机部决定先搞一个单级固体近程导弹(东风六十一号),以积累经验,锻炼队伍,进行基地建设,然后再发展多级中、远程固体导弹。( 《钱学森年谱 初编 》 ,p231)

1967年1月24日  国防科委审查单级固体近程导弹(东风六十一号)方案,发现虽然能较快研制出固体导弹,但元器件、原材料、机电配套件借用液体导弹,弹体较笨重,弹上设备大,精度差,性能不理想。在这次审查会上,国防科委经与总参、炮兵及七机部共同研究后,决定停止东风六十一号研制,集中力量研制巨龙七十一号(后改为巨浪一号)潜射中程对地导弹。( 《钱学森年谱 初编 》 ,p245)

1967年3月2日  上午,召集罗舜初、国防工办副主任李如洪以及刘杰、李党、朱光亚、陈能宽等开会,听取汇报氢弹研制工作的安排和进展情况,二机部九院1967年科研生产计划会议,调整修改核武器研制两年规划的打算。在朱光亚汇报过程中说:搞核武器研究,可以实行研究人员、工程师、技术工人三结合的方式进行,这是个好办法。战术核武器可以探索,但不作重点。(《聂荣臻年谱 (下卷)》1054-1055页 )

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俞大光院士口述《报国千古事 甘苦寸心知》:1975年全所紧急动员为毛泽东签署的575计划服务。

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赴核爆炸试验现场 为国防科研献青春

   1975年12月23日下午5点钟,在机车的汽笛声中车轮滚动,一长串列车缓缓离开丰台军用火车站,我们挥手告别欢送的领导和同志们,奔向核爆炸试验基地——罗布泊。这次核爆炸试验代号为21-44任务,是小型战术核武器,它标志我国核技术发展到新的水平。

   (1976年)1月23日早8点起床,早饭后10点集合前往距爆心20公里处的参观点。20多辆解放牌大卡车浩浩荡荡穿越戈壁滩,半个小时到达。有1000多人前来观看,各军兵种之间相互拉歌、喊话,都很兴奋,场面热闹,犹如盛大节日。现场大喇叭不时传来指挥部的声音,宣布参观注意事项,传达中央领导电话指示。11点50分左右,中央军委命令按原计划试验,基地指挥部要求参观人员一律戴好防护眼镜(防止爆炸后火球引起闪光盲),接着倒计时:10、9、8、7、6、5、4、3、2、1,起爆,在西南方向出现了一个“太阳”,发出耀眼的光芒,地面升起巨大的沙尘柱,快速地向上翻滚,越来越大,几分钟后就形成了蘑菇云。同时传来震耳的轰鸣,指挥部宣布21-44试验成功,参观队伍立即欢腾起来,高呼“毛主席万岁”、“中国共产党万岁”。20多分钟后,大风推动蘑菇云向东南方向移动,逐渐消失在远方。

我国的战术核武器计划 - kktt - 长缨在手  敢缚苍龙

我国的战术核武器计划 - kktt - 长缨在手  敢缚苍龙

1978年2月14日 中央专门委员会召开会议。要求进一步探讨战术核武器在政治上、军事上的利弊。邓小平指出,战术核武器我看还是搞中子弹。(《钱学森年谱》上册,第410页)

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China's Ballistic Missile Programs
John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di
International Security, Fall 1992 (Vol. 17, No. 2), pp 32-33

Another attempt to develop tactical ballistic missiles occurred in June 1966, at the onset of the Cultural Revolution. With the spotlight on Mao, all institutes competed for his approval, and the Fourth Academy, envious of the First Academy's celebrated contributions to the DF program, proposed the development of a single-stage solid-propellant tactical missile. The Fourth had achieved success in casting grains of polysulfide-rubber-based composite solid propellants up to one meter in diameter. The size was too small for long-range missiles but adequate for small tactical weapons.

The proposed missile, first dubbed DF-41 and later DF-61, did not receive high-level approval but, like many other projects at the time, work on it proceeded at the local level despite Beijing's lack of interest in tactical missiles. The program's fate thus depended principally on the mood of the society, and it quietly died when the fervor of the moment passed on to other targets. Almost as a consolation prize, the central leadership assigned the Fourth Academy the task of starting the JL-1 SLBM program in March 1967.

Interest in a tactical missile did not reappear until 1975. In April that year, during Kim II Sung(金日成)'s visit to Beijing, North Korean Defense Minister O Jin U (吴振宇) inquired whether China could equip his forces with 600 km missiles. The Chinese said no, but the timing of O's question coincided with the PLA's interest in developing weapons that could counter the Soviet threat along the Chinese border. At a meeting in 1975, the head of the Operations Department of the PLA General Staff argued that a few such missiles, either conventional or nuclear, could block remote mountainous passes along the border and thereby halt or impede a Soviet invasion. The Central Military Commission agreed.

It authorized an immediate R&D program and gave the project the same DF-61 name as the aborted 1966 project. The task was to build a missile for both foreign military assistance and domestic use. At that time, the Chinese supported the transfer to North Korea as a political rather than a financial arrangement. It would help draw Pyongyang away from Moscow. The program was approved in 1976.

This single-stage mobile missile, unlike the 1966 DF-61, would have a pre-packed liquid propellant and come in a 600km version with a 1,000kg conventional warhead and a 1,000km, 500kg nuclear version for Chinese use only. Its designers studied the use of cluster bomblets and fuel-air explosives for the conventional warheads. In 1976 the army tested the effectiveness of these warheads by detonating American weapons which had been captured by the Vietnamese and transferred to China.

The builders of the one-by-nine-meter DF-61 sought to adapt many of the DF technologies to the DF-61. Its fully inertial computerized strap-down guidance system and propellant (AK-40 and UDMH) mirrored those of the DF-14 mobile IRBM then under development. The DF-61 would use four vernier combustion chambers (and their associated servomechanisms for attitude control) and a turbo-pump system; these technologies were to be derived from the DF-5's second stage. The Chinese hoped that the DF-61 would exceed the performance of the somewhat comparable American Lance and Soviet Scud-C. However, the DF-61 program, which had been backed by Chen Xilian (陈锡联 who was then running the daily affairs of the Central Military Commission), collapsed when Chen was ousted in 1978.
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